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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the political disputes and legal contentions occasioned by the 
process of regulatory reform undergone by Romanian mutual fund industry. Stirred by 
Romania’s accession into the European Union in 2007 and prompted by the numerous 
financial scandals affecting the market right from its creation in 1994, the reform is 
meant as a reconfiguration of the investment philosophy characterizing the capital 
market. My claim is that the uneasy reception of the new institutional arrangement is 
related to the shifting premises for the formation of value and the deeper changes in the 
prevalent conceptions of worth associated with Romania’s economic transition. 
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Introduction 
This paper analyzes the disputes occasioned by the process of regulatory reform undergone 
by Romanian mutual fund industry. Stirred by Romania’s accession into the European Union 
(EU) in 2007 and prompted by the numerous financial scandals affecting the market right 
from its creation in 1994, the reform is meant as a reconfiguration of the investment 
philosophy characterizing the capital market. The paper draws on a wider research project 
concerned with the renegotiation of social values in post-communist Romania.  The emergent 
values here are intimately connected to and made visible by arguments about new meanings 
of money, altered understandings of risk, or changing roles for the state and its regulatory 
agencies in post-communism and during a period of assumed Europeanization. The main 
questions of my paper are: how do new forms of investment and monetary accumulation 
dependent on the erratic behavior of the market fit with previous notions of money whose 
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value was intimately linked to personal diligence (or any legitimate form of work)? Should 
the state be concerned with the taming of generalized forms of social risk through direct 
intervention or should it limit its role to the adoption and enforcement of technocratic rules? 
How does the intense institutional import from the European Union play into the existing 
local disputes over money, value, and property? How are “European” categories mediated by 
existing conceptions of worth?   
I take the contentions generated by this radical transformation as an opportunity to 
observe the shifting premises for the formation of value and the changing notions of worth in 
contemporary Romania (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). Whereas formerly mutual funds were 
associative entities which, in spite of the ambiguous ownership, could be controlled by a 
collective of investors (through a Council of Trustees), the legal reforms attribute control 
over funds to management firms and do away with the premises for collective action by 
investors. The transition from a political order in which the premises for rights, action and 
value were defined collectively, as part of a larger community of investors, to a polity in 
which criteria of worth are premised on the more abstract qualification of investors - as actors 
able to choose among investment opportunities but no longer to influence the projects they 
take part in, generates numerous contentions with a direct impact on the legitimacy of the 
new institutional arrangements. 
By focusing on a particular instance in which the “laws of the market” (Callon 1998) 
are negotiated by state officials, regulators, institutional investors, and lay investors, my 
paper offers an interpretation of the ambivalent reception of contemporary capitalism in 
Eastern Europe and suggests ways to evaluate such historical transformations in other former 
socialist societies. This analysis, thus, shares a topical interest in social change with the 
previous “transition studies” and “postsocialist studies” but moves beyond these somehow 
dated literatures pursuing a concern with “Europeanization” and the forms of policy-making 
(mainly the conditions of political action) in the European Union (EU). 
   This paper draws on observation and interviews among the representatives of small 
investors involved in the drafting and evaluation of the new regulations, and interviews with 
European and Romanian securities regulators, representatives of investment management 
companies, brokerage companies and depositaries for investment funds.2 It also draws on the 
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Securities Commission (CNVM), of the Brokers’ Association, of the Union of Collective Investors in 
Transferable Securities (UNOPC), of depositaries for investment funds and of the National Association for the 
Protection of Investors (ANPI) in Bucharest, as well as with representatives of the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) in Paris.  
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study of case files of trials initiated by market actors contesting various provisions of the new 
regulations, and on a comparative analysis of laws and regulations for the capital market in 
Romania.  
 
Money and values in post-communist Eastern Europe 
Money has been one of the most interesting topics of research in postsocialist studies, a 
domain of practice where the social change after 1989 has been the most conspicuous, 
available for observation and study. Although previous works in the social sciences have 
already looked into the transformation of monetary practices, they have focused either on 
monetary aggregates and the policies aimed to control them (in the case of economists or 
political scientists), or on the role of money in market exchange and the social practices 
involving cash (in the case of anthropologists and sociologists). Thus, economists and 
political scientists have written about systematic monetary reforms (Stiglitz 1993; Mullineux 
1996; Bléjer and Skreb 1998;), about the dynamic of monetary aggregates and of inflation (de 
Grauwe and Lavrac 1999; Buchenrieder 2002), or about the institutional and legal 
arrangements governing monetary policies neglecting usually popular understandings of 
money or the role of meaning as an ingredient of social action (Amsden and Kochanowicz 
1994; Rostowski 1995; Wihlborg 1999; Dickinson and Mullineux 2001; Sevic 2002). 
Sociologists have also described transformations in social processes mediated by money but 
have focused either on the institutional (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Markiewicz 2007) or on the 
distributional (Seabright 2000; Cernat 2004; Korovilas 2004) implications of such 
transformations, privileging social realities at the expense of individual agency and paying 
almost no attention to the construction of monetary categories through social action itself.  
 Closer to my approach, anthropologists of Eastern Europe have studied money by 
focusing on the declining role of currency (Woodruff 1999; Clarke 2000; Humphrey 2000), 
the emergence of pyramid schemes (Verdery 1995a, b), the production of knowledge and 
capital (Verdery 1995b, 1996), or the reconfiguration of moral categories (Lemon 1998; Ries 
2002; Mandel and Humphrey 2002) in everyday transactions involving cash and barter.  
Although more attentive to the details and diversity of social situations, 
anthropologists of Eastern Europe have so far shied away from engaging the practices of 
financial elites. Few have focused on more abstract notions of money, on the social 
construction of financial schemes, or on the regulatory interventions aimed to govern the 
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processes of monetary accumulation.3 My research addresses specifically these kinds of 
processes considering them an ideal context for the study of the concomitant reorganization 
of monetary practices and social values. My work is particularly indebted to the literatures in 
the anthropology of money (Maurer 2005a, 2006; Hart 2000, 2005), the sociology of 
financial markets (Callon 1998; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2004) and the economy of 
conventions (Juhem 1994; Thevenot 2001; Woolsey Biggart and Beamish 2003). Such 
literatures try to understand the forms of sociality connected to finance capitalism (Knorr 
Cetina and Bruegger 2002a, b, c), the forms of knowledge supporting contemporary financial 
markets (Callon 1998; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2004; Beunza and Stark 2004a, b), the abstract 
forms of commensuration and risk management mediated by modern money (LiPuma and 
Lee 2002, 2004; Maurer 1999), or the substantive engagement of markets by financial 
practitioners (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2002; Zaloom 2004; Miyazaki 2006).  
The distinctive aspect of my approach is the focus on a specific instance where the 
regulatory dimensions of capitalism are filtered through the local disputes over money, value, 
and ownership by those directly affected by the regulations. By trying to come to terms with 
a particular historical context – Romania’s ongoing integration into the European Union, my 
research shifts focus from the production of knowledge in the heart of high finance (s.a. the 
investment banks of London and New York analyzed by many engaged in the social studies 
of finance) to the negotiation of forms, norms, regulations and values taking place in a rather 
peripheral setting currently incorporated in the late capitalist system. Not only it is in such 
settings that the most elementary ideas related to contemporary forms of money are 
continuously called into question, but, as the recent crisis of the sub-prime financial products 
shows, even the most abstract financial practices build on and directly impact the transactions 
making up everyday life: buying a house, saving for retirement, or investing in forms of 
money that promise not to be affected by inflation.  
 
Mutual funds and their regulation in Romania 
Investment funds constituted one the most promising areas of the financial sector during the 
post-communist period, both from the perspective of institutional creativity and from that of 
the return on investments. Constituting a repertoire of practice altogether new, distinct from 
the few opportunities for investing money under communism, investment funds were 
                                               
3
 The notable exceptions are Bill Maurer (1998, 1999, 2002, 2006), Annelise Riles (2000a, 2000b, 2001), 
Hirokazu Miazaky (2006) and Caitlyn Zaloom (2003, 2004, 2005) who work in different parts of the world and 
focus usually on the speculative practices of financial traders and the activity of regulatory bodies in developed 
financial systems. 
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ambiguously situated (perceived) by the public in between the stock exchange, the emerging 
commercial banks (themselves something different from the sole state savings bank in 
communism to which lay investors had access), and ponzi schemes proliferating throughout 
Romania during the 1990s. While public perceptions of the funds departed considerably from 
the institutional varieties adopted in Romania as well as from the Western models considered 
in the process, the promise of enrichment through financial speculation were built in the 
sector from the beginning. Investments funds, coming both in the “close-end” varieties and as 
mutual funds,4 were meant, at least by the Romanian architects of the economic reform 
(Vosganian  1999; Anghelache 2000), to support the creation and growth of the capital 
market, to channel savings into investments for newly privatized companies, and to give an 
opportunity to retail investors to diversify their portfolios.  
Although they took off rapidly capitalizing on the newly created opportunities in the 
Romanian economy, mutual funds were subject to some of the most notorious collapses in 
post-communist Romania due to a combination of poor regulation, weak enforcement of 
rules, and fraudulent behavior of fund managers. Such was the case with two mutual funds 
that collapsed in 2000 (the National Investment Fund [FNI] and the National Accumulation 
Fund [FNA]) washing away the savings of hundreds of thousands of investors and producing 
a wide reaching political scandal. These funds, whose histories are briefly presented below, 
had far reaching implications on the regulatory regime regarding the capital market and 
illustrates well the themes approached by this paper.  
 Romanian capital market, created in the mid 1990s and affected by numerous 
scandals from the beginning, had a period of consistent growth after 1997 when stabilization 
and privatization policies were given an impetus by a newly elected right wing coalition of 
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 Of direct relevance to the questions addressed by this paper, mutual funds (a.k.a., open-end funds) are 
basically collective investment entities in which investors buy shares. Theoretically, they have several 
advantages over alternative investment vehicles and especially over close-end funds (a.k.a., risk funds): 1. they 
allow people to pool resources and make more efficient and less risky investments with the help of skillful 
administrators; 2. they allow the purchasing and redeeming of shares (i.e., entry and exit) on an ongoing basis. 
Administrators are supposed to implement the investments strategies and to calculate and declare publicly the 
current values of the shares (value of all investments less financial obligations divided by number of shares in 
circulation). Money and other financial assets of the funds are kept by depositary banks which also keep a 
separate record certifying or not the public values of the shares declared by administrators. Regulators (in 
Romania the National Securities Commission - CNVM) supervise the activity of administrators and depositaries 
and issues new regulations regarding the activity of these funds. Whereas in most of the Western countries 
mutual funds would be considered relatively safe financial ventures with a passive portfolio administration 
strategy, in Romania they became the epitome of financial hazards after several notorious collapses that washed 
away the life-savings of hundreds of thousands of lay investors. For a classification of European types of 
investment funds see the web site of the European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) at 
www.efama.org; for the American varieties and their regulation see the website of the Investment Company 
Institute (ICI) at www.ici.org.  
 6 
parties.5 After a problematic beginning,6 the investment fund industry took off again at the 
end of the 1990s capitalizing on the growth of the stock exchange and on the more numerous 
financial instruments available. In spite of the promising new beginning, it was not long until 
a new scandal hit the market in 2000. The National Investment Fund (FNI) - a mutual fund 
reaching a record level of investors (over 300,000 during the months preceding its collapse), 
very high reported net asset values and a large share of the market for mutual funds, 
collapsed right before the general elections leaving several hundred thousand investors 
without their life savings and retirement benefits. The reaction of the supervisory agency 
(CNVM) was typically late, unwise and did more harm than good to the retail investors. 
While the trials related to the collapse of 2000 are not over yet and the numerous audit 
reports by court appointed experts have been at best superficial, enough information were 
disclosed to find out that the fund has functioned without a depositary form most of its life, 
that the caps on the proportion of the portfolio that could be legally invested in unlisted 
securities and other risky financial instruments have been constantly broken, and that 
members of the Council of Trustees have been bribed to ignore the illegal transactions of the 
asset managers. Reported net asset values have been purposefully inflated, asset managers for 
the fund have been changed repeatedly to obscure responsibility for mismanagement, and the 
securities commission has chosen to take only last moment measures in spite of being aware 
of the situation all the time.  
 The episode precipitated the collapse of the National Accumulation Fund (FNA), the 
twin fund of FNI,  a couple of months later generating massive requests to redeem the share 
by retail investors; their attempts, however, have been blocked by the repeated suspension of 
operations of the two mutual funds ordered by CNVM. Public nervousness at the time 
determined the redeeming of shares in the rest of the mutual funds by many retail investors, 
the drastic reduction of the overall number of investment fund shareholders (from over 
400,000 to less than 40,000 in a year), and the spread of the confidence crisis to the banking 
sector (rumors lead to massive withdrawals from the Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR) – 
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 The Romanian Democratic Convention [CDR] came to power after the elections of 1996 defeating the ruling 
social democratic party. In spite of the mixed results of their office, CDR and it allies in power implement the 
necessary macro-stabilization measures and tried to speed-up the process of privatization. Both these sets of 
policies are generally thought to have had a favorable impact on the emerging capital market in Romania. 
6
 While the first mutual funds in Romania were created in 1994, the National Securities Commission (CNVM) 
was created only one year later. The tighter regulations with regards to investment practices and portfolio 
valuation adopted by the newly created regulatory commission  in 1996 led to the collapse of several of the 
funds that had embarked on risky and potentially valueless investments previously. For a brief but well informed 
description of the episode of 1996 and its circumstances see Vosganian (1999).  
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the largest state bank in the system, which almost lead to the precipitate collapse of the bank 
in the fall of 2000).7  
 Acting to recuperate the money lost and for the conviction of those responsible, many 
of the investors affected by the collapse of the investment funds have gathered in civic 
associations (NGOs) that militate for the protection of investors and the rights of minority 
shareholders. Even more consequential than the actions for material and moral reparations 
have been the increasing calls by institutional and retail investors alike for the revision of the 
previous regulations governing investment funds and for the improvement of the supervisory 
activity by state institutions. Public debates concluded that the need for a comprehensive 
reform was urgent. The goals of the reform should be to tighten regulations regarding 
investment funds and the activity of asset managers and to reorganize the securities 
commission (CNVM) in order to enhance its supervisory abilities.  After the less successful 
adoption of a new securities law in 2002 (without public consultations and widely contested 
by the majority of market participants), the opportunity for a more comprehensive market 
reform was offered by the wider legal harmonization with the EU (the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire) in light of Romania’s prospective admission into the Union in 2007.  
 
The Lamfalussy process and capital market reform in Romania   
The Romanian National Securities Commission responded to pressures to harmonize its 
securities and financial investments regulatory framework with that of the rest of EU 
members and embarked on a massive exercise in legal reform. Such pressures were by the 
European Commission (EC), by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) to 
whose meetings it took part with observer status, and by the capital market participants in 
Romania (including retail investors in mutual funds). CNVM promoted a new statutory law as 
well as a new regulation for investment management firms, collective investment 
undertakings and depositories in 2004.8 
The key role in the adoption of new laws regulating the capital market in Romania, 
ones also meant to facilitate new processes of policy making in the field, has been played by 
the Council of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and its measures towards more 
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 The archival collection of the most important daily and weekly newspapers of the time (s.a. Evenimentul zilei, 
Adevărul, Curentul, Capital, Bursa) accurately describe both the series of events that lead to the near collapse of 
the bank and the panic of the investors.  
8
 See Law no. 297 of 2004 regarding the capital market and CNVM Regulation No. 15 of 2004 rregarding the 
authorization and functioning of investment management firms, collective investment undertaking and 
depositories. 
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integrated capital markets in Europe.9 The model for the new regulations was provided by the 
EU directives and Regulations adopted by the European Commission after having been 
drafted by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)”. CESR is a 
consultative committee set up to help the EC in its initiative to harmonize and integrate 
European capital markets with the aim of facilitating cross border investments and financial 
capital mobility in Europe. Its goals are not only to make national governments adopt 
harmonized regulations and to stimulate better cooperation among national securities 
regulators, but also to promote new modalities for policy making and the adoption of 
regulatory measures regarding the capital markets. The new policy making mechanisms 
draws on broad consultations with all market actors (including lay investors) and is premised 
on the transparent adoption of new regulations. 
In more detail, CESR is the concrete result of a series of action plans and policies 
outlined in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) initiated by the European Commission 
in 1999 and made an integral part of the “Lisbon Agenda” by the European Council in Lisbon 
in April 2000. FSAP’s aim was to further the creation of a single market in financial services 
within the EU; it also identified the need of pan-European reforms in securities markets 
regulations that could be addressed by the adoption of new laws, by the implementation of 
new law-making policies, and by paying attention to the mechanisms of market supervision. 
A Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of Security Markets chaired by Baron Alexandre 
Lamfalussy was mandated by the ECOFIN of July 17, 2000 to produce a more accurate 
diagnosis of the state of capital market regulation across Europe and to suggest more specific 
policies to further their integration.  
Apart from a lucid evaluation of the weaknesses in European capital markets, the 
Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets10 suggested a systematic set 
of measures organized according to a four level approach consisting of framework principles 
(level 1), directives and regulations to implement the principles (level 2), enhanced 
cooperation among national securities regulators to implement levels 1 and 2 (level 3), and 
actions to enforce Community law and to strengthen European coordination in securities 
regulation (level 4). To sum up, the Lamfalussy process was meant to introduce not only new 
(harmonized) principles and regulations of securities markets but to institutionalize a new 
process of policy making in the field characterized by broad and transparent consultations 
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 The ensemble of institutions and policies centered on CESR is also known at the European Union level as the 
Lamfalussy process. 
10
 See Committee of Wise Men (2001), Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 
available at www.cesr-eu.org . 
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with, the incorporation of suggestions from, and the strengthened cooperation among all 
market actors. 11 
According to annual reports published by the securities commission (CNVM)12 and to 
assessments by market participants, Romania has transposed, even if somehow 
“mechanically” and without paying attention to the costs of immediate compliance by market 
actors, all key EU directives and regulations adopted by the European Commission with 
technical advice from CESR.13 Concretely, while Law no. 297 of 2004 and CNVM 
Regulation no. 15 of 2004 transposed all pre-Lamfalussy EU regulations regarding securities 
(including the 1985 directive on the undertakings in collective investments in transferable 
securities [UCITS]14) and the Lamfalussy directives regarding ‘prospectus’ and ‘market 
abuse,’ the new legal framework soon became dated given the relatively high pace of reform 
at the European level. Subsequently, new regulatory interventions by the Romanian securities 
commission meant to transpose the post-2004 directives and regulation adopted by the EU 
were made in 2006 and 2007. Furthermore, new regulations are announced by CNVM that are 
meant to address the requests by market participants to specify more clearly the procedural 
aspects of the new rules, to eliminate the overlaps between the law on the capital market, 
regulations covering banking services, and the Company Act, as well as to redesign the entire 
law regarding the capital market (with a possible institutional reorganization of the securities 
commission itself).  
  
The impact of the new regulations on corporate governance in mutual funds  
In spite of the efforts to transpose the best European practices in the filed through the recent 
regulatory reform and of the best intentions of all market actors (regulators, intermediaries 
and investors), the results have not met everybody’s expectations. Although, based on Law 
no. 52 of 2003 regarding transparency of decision-making in public administration, adopted 
also under EU pressure, CNVM has organized meetings and accepted suggestions from 
various interested parties (institutional investors, administrators, depositaries) including 
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 For a more detailed presentation of the working methods and policies implemented by CESR see ,How CESR 
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context&mac=0&id=  and the excellent book by Ellis Ferran (2004). 
12
 All the CNVM annual reports can be downloaded from the website of the institution at: http://www.cnvmr.ro/ 
en/raportanual.htm.  
13
 The most important ‘Lamfalussy’ directives adopted by the European Commission through the co-decision 
procedure and after consultation of market actors by CESR are the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse 
Directive, the Transparency Directive, and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
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 See Directive 85/611/EEC of the Council (UCITS) on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). 
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associations for the protection of investors, the result has been ambivalent, areas of 
improvement alternating with provisions that are either inapplicable or extremely costly when 
compared to the benefits in terms of market transparency and investor protection. Regulations 
concerning mutual funds and financial investment companies have received a mixed 
reception from asset managers, brokers, and institutional investors. Although they 
acknowledge the considerable improvements from the pre-2004 regulations (in terms of 
institutional clarity; better allocation of responsibility between managers, depositaries and 
distributors of funds; clear rules regarding prospectus; easier administrative procedures and 
registration of funds; simplified entry and exist procedures), such institutional actors claim 
that the current regulatory framework was already left behind by the current developments in 
EU regulations and in management practices of European fund administrators (as reflected by 
EFAMA recommendations and implemented indicators of fund performance/risk).15 
Furthermore, the Romanian securities commission has transposed many of the European 
regulations overnight, based on poor translations, and without paying enough attention to the 
practicalities of enforcing the new provisions. This makes necessary a lot of “trimming” of 
the newly adopted laws and regulations meant to reduce institutional uncertainty and the 
costs of compliance with the rules. 
 At the same time, representatives of retail investors and most of the financial 
journalists make a more critical assessment of the recent legal provisions. Thus, with regards 
to investor protection the new regulatory framework is less comprehensive than the pre-2004 
one (developed in the mid-1990s with USAID support and modeled on US-SEC 
regulations)16 especially with regards to the rights of individual investors. The shareholders 
of mutual funds functioning according to the old regulations voted in a General Assembly on 
issues pertaining to the activity of the fund and were represented by a Council of Trustees 
mandated to overlook the activity of asset managers. Although the involvement of the 
Trustees has been a fiasco in the case of the mutual funds that collapsed in the past, many 
consider this is no reason to eliminate it altogether. The new regulations (in tune with those 
of European-type investment funds) remove both the General Assembly and the Council of 
Trustees allocating the ownership and responsibility of operating investment funds to asset 
managers. The protection of investors is effected by the more clearly written mandatory 
                                               
15
 The European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA). More information available at: 
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provisions of the prospectus and by easing the entry and exit procedures for holders of fund 
units (shares) when major changes in management, organizational structure or investment 
strategy are operated. The attempts by the associations of investors and independent experts 
to provide more generous entry/exit terms for the shareholders, to create the possibility for 
independent oversight of the asset manager activity, and even to preserve some of the 
favorable provisions of the old regulations have met the refusal of the securities commission 
and the criticism of the asset management industry. 
 The effect on the governance of these collective entities has also been ambivalent. 
Thus, asset managers seem to repudiate altogether the issues pertaining to corporate 
governance from the discussions about the EU harmonized investment funds. For them, 
corporate governance refers to relations inside asset management companies and, at the most, 
those inside financial investment companies. Form such a perspective, the principles 
governing relations among the diverse stakeholders of investments funds (an especially those 
among retail investors and asset managers) are obscured when subsumed by the prospectus 
provisions and the entry/exit provisions. This comes in direct contradiction to the demands of 
retail investors. They claim that, given the histories of deception on Romanian financial 
markets and the poor record of law enforcement there, the concern of investors with the 
security of their money cannot simply be relegated to impersonal rules. They claim that the 
existence of comprehensive rules did not prevent the previous collapses of mutual funds. 
They also do not trust the securities commission with enforcing existing regulations given 
both its past record of ambivalent supervision and it current performance during public 
consultations.17 
As a consequence, associations of investors accuse CNVM of having organized 
superficial and formal consultations and of not having incorporated their suggestions meant 
to enforce the rights of retail investors or to improve corporate governance in investment 
funds, all in the advantage of professional investors and fund administrators. At least from the 
point of view of retail investors, so far the process of harmonization with the EU framework 
has led to deregulation, with ambivalent results and affecting asymmetrically various 
interested parties. This situation has stirred further public protests from the association of 
investors and has lead to court action against the Romanian securities commission by market 
actors intending to force the suspension or modification of the new regulations. 
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 All these opinions were expressed at a focus group organized by the author as part of a research project 
supported by Freedom House Romania and funded by CERGE-EI Foundation (Czech Republic). 
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The mediation of European regulatory forms by local disputes on Romanian capital 
market 
As already mentioned in the first sections of the paper, the regulatory reforms described 
above have been prompted by and filtered through the disputes over the sounding financial 
collapses affecting the mutual fund industry. The recent regulatory harmonization has 
ultimately played into some of the very legal and institutional contentions that have made it 
necessary complicating the situation further. Such is the case with the two investment funds 
whose history I have been documenting for the past two years: the National Investment Fund 
[FNI] and the National Accumulation Fund [FNA].  
Working with some of investors in the default funds, witnessing numerous of their 
weekly meetings, the forms of public protest adopted by their representatives, and the trials 
initiated against those responsible for the collapse of the funds, I focus on the changing 
meanings of money, on the forms of monetary commensuration facilitating assessments of 
value, as well as on the allocation of responsibilities and compensations as modalities to 
bring a resolution to the disputes. Such disputes give me the opportunity to focus on ideas of 
measurability of value, that is, on the usefulness and modalities in which money can be used 
as a reliable measure to assess the values of the funds and of the compensations. Although 
this seems a straightforward issue it is not. Not only do financial theories, legal codes and, 
securities regulations provide divergent interpretations, but the actants involved in disputes 
(including lay investors) suggest new and interesting ways of understanding ideas of wealth, 
monetary gain, profit, risks, and state guarantees. Moreover, there is an intimate relation 
between arguments about economic value formation and the moral justifications for practices 
that generate value. By this I mean that particular moral perspectives recommend specific 
assessments of value (ex: profit, work, gamble, monetary gain). Those making a claim to 
specific commensurations of value use more than technical arguments trying to manipulate 
(and even reconstitute) available moral repertoires and actively situate their more or less 
scientific claims in a moral perspective. Their justifications are meant to present their 
calculations as not only technically accurate but as being in agreement with the already 
accepted moral values (something Boltanski and Thevenot call “orders of worth” [2006]). 
  Given the multifaceted contentions over values, it comes as no surprise that the 
consequences of these disputes are not limited to the recuperation of losses but aim at 
redefining the rules of investment and influencing the conditions under which some of the 
existing financial organizations can be continued. As explained above, at least as 
consequential as investors’ actions for material and moral reparations have been their 
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campaigns for the revision of the previous regulations governing investment funds and for the 
improvement of the supervisory activity by state institutions. Such calls for regulatory 
interventions have been justified not only by examples of past financial defaults but also by 
the contemporary trajectory of the collapsed mutual funds. The most notorious such funds 
(e.g., Businessmen’s Fund [FOA/SAFI] defaulted in 1996, of National Investment Fund [FNI] 
and National Accumulation Fund [FNA] collapsed in 20000) have not been legally dissolved. 
Rather, they have been repeatedly suspended from operations and later transformed into 
close-end funds having increasingly rigid entry/exit procedures. While advocates of such 
organizational transmogrifications argue that the funds have been given a second chance, 
small investors generally feel “trapped” in the new entities (as “serfs on financial estates”), 
argue they have lost control of their money, and complain that such measures are meant to 
conceal the responsibilities of those involved in the initial collapse of the funds 
(administrators and state officials alike).  
As already pointed out, the reform has taken a hasty and chaotic aspect as the most 
immediate goal was that of adopting the European regulations before the closing of the 
accession negotiation. The suggestions made by lay investors have been consistently 
neglected without justification from the Romanian securities commission and in spite of the 
fact that no contrary position on any of the issues in dispute has been adopted by any other of 
the market actors. No wonder, then, that the most vocal contesters of the new laws have been 
the representatives of small investors. They argue that the American-inspired regulatory 
framework were better as it attributed a more important role to non-institutional investors. To 
blame for the numerous financial defaults are not the rules themselves, representatives of 
retail investors believe, but different actors responsible for the sound functioning of the 
capital  market. Small investors argue that, lacking a proper “investment culture”, regulators, 
administrators, and investors alike have mimicked the American procedures of collective 
governance without adopting its basic values. According to them, the solution should have 
consisted of piecemeal regulatory interventions, improved supervision, and proper 
enforcement of regulations.18 
The new regulatory framework takes away the investors’ possibility to voice their 
concerns (by eliminating the Council of Trustees and its attributions) and only leaves them 
                                               
18
 Such opinions were expressed by the leaders of the Association for the Protection of Investors [ANPI], the 
most prominent NGO representing investors in the penal trials against the managers of the defaulted funds and 
in negotiations with CNVM over the form of the new regulations regarding mutual funds. They were 
documented during interviews realized by the researcher in 2007 and 2008 and in the frequent opinion pieces 
published by the president of ANPI in the daily financial newspaper Bursa. 
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the possibility to exit collective investment undertakings (Hirschman 1970). More precisely, 
investment funds are now initiated and controlled by administrators (specialized financial 
companies), and investors are allowed to redeem their shares for a very brief period of time 
when major changes to their Articles of Incorporation are made.19 Small investors fear the 
new legal infrastructure of the market will become just another “form without substance”20 if 
the regulators keep siding with institutional investors and ignoring lay investors.  
At the same time, state officials and fund administrators argue that the new 
regulations are “more modern and harmonized [with European directives]”.21 The emulation 
of the EU regulatory framework will not only create the premises for Romania’s 
incorporation into the common market for financial services but, its supporters believe, brings 
a “new philosophy” for the fund industry. Thus, the intricacies of collective ownership and 
action generated by the old legislation will be eliminated by a clear allocation of control to 
administrators and the protection of investors by more clear and transparent procedures. In 
the long run, Romanian regulators hope the imitation of European institutions and the 
opening up of Romanian capital market to European financial service providers will increase 
its soundness and will inculcate the “proper values” to Romanian investors. 
The succinct description of the current state of the collective investment undertakings 
(i.e. mutual funds) in Romania the way it is reflected by the diverging opinions of the various 
market actors must integrate at least two perspectives. Thus, it is true, from a certain 
perspective, that the new regulatory infrastructure can facilitate the circulation of financial 
capitals (as the Romanian securities regulators argue) but not enforced properly they offer 
plenty of leeway to deceptive fund administrators.22 From a different perspective, lay 
investors are right to claim that the previous collective ownership provisions were closer to 
the principles of mutuality and offered better means of control over their money but their 
persistence in refusing to accept any kind of change can make them anachronistic.  
 
                                               
19
 All of these are specific provision of Law no. 297 of 2004 and of CNVM Regulation no. 15 of 2004 cited 
above. 
20
 The expression resumes one of the most significant critical opinions expressed against the rapid 
modernization of Romania and the institutional import from the West during the nineteenth century. Formulated 
by the Conservative lawyer and literary critic Titu Maiorescu (1840-1917) the position resumed above generated 
one of the longer lasting and important cultural debates in modern Romania. 
21
 The evaluation of the new regulations was made by two CNVM directors in a personal interview realized by 
the author in September 2006. 
22
 FNI and FNA were only the most notorious cases of mutual fund collapses in post-communist Romania. 
Several other examples of funds that lost important amounts of their values when the deceptive practices of asset 
managers were uncovered are less known outside Romania although they feed into the concerns of the investors 
described by this paper. 
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Social change, capitalism, and transforming orders of worth in contemporary Romania  
The attentive examination of the disputes over regulations briefly described above allows us 
to understand better three processes at play in this situation, all of them subsumed by the 
more general process of social change. First, the dispute illustrates well the ways in which 
transnational processes involving the financial market (in this case, the pan-European 
harmonization of capital markets) is locally constituted and interpreted through the lens of 
local disputes. An EU driven regulatory process takes a diversity of forms in local arenas, the 
specific socio-political contexts that mediate it locally being to a considerable extent 
responsible both for the end result of the reform, for its practical consequences, and for its 
subsequent legitimacy. 
 Second, actors situated in local milieus manipulate such regulatory processes for 
their own ends building in a diversity of meanings that often contradict the intentions of the 
initiators of the process. The rhetoric used by the actors involved facilitates ones 
understanding of the ways „Europeanization” and „European values” become powerful 
argumentative repertoires in contemporary Romania, although ones displaying a remarkable 
internal diversity. In a polity where the EU accession became the overarching legitimating 
discourse, hierarchies of power and the endorsement of particular institutional forms (as 
„more genuinely European”) are realized through the pragmatic manipulation and the 
creative redefinition of the meanings of European categories or „Europeanness.” 
 Third, the situation described sheds light on the negotiations of the various moral / 
economic / legal criteria according to which a particular perspective on changes affecting the 
market is accepted as more relevant than alternative ones. Alternative regimes of value 
compete for constituting the legitimating basis for legal-economic disputes. As already 
illustrated, the actors involved in disputes do not only struggle to put their claims in accord to 
one regime of value or another but constantly argue over the relevant regime. In the process 
they actively renegotiate and reconfigure the prevalent „orders of worth” in which their 
disputes over value are dynamically situated. 
Echoing old polemics between cultural theorists regarding the modernization of 
Romania, that is, those between the supporters of Europeanization proposing the “theory of 
synchronism”23 and the Conservative critics of rapid institutional imports from the West 
                                               
23
 Considered the conceptual and political opposite of the criticism of “forms without substance” proposed by 
Titut Maiorescu, the “theory of synchronism” elaborated by literary critic Eugen Lovinescu (1881-1943) in his 
Istoria civilizaIstoria civilizţiei române moderne (The History of Modern Romanian Civilization) and Istoria 
literaturii române contemporane (History of Contemporary Romanian Literature) advocated the controlled 
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writing about the dangers of adopting “forms without substance”24, the current dispute 
between the critics of rapid institutional import and the advocates of modernization-qua-
emulation of European political forms tends to overlook the situated character of the process 
of regulatory reform. Both parties neglect the diversity of the actors on Romanian capital 
market, portraying them as passive and uncritical receptors of cultural forms, devoid of 
agency. Consequently, both interpretations ignore the local adaptation of imported forms and, 
in spite of the numerous allegations of corruption and personal involvement, miss the 
pragmatics of this mimetic act (Jayussi 1984, 1991).  
The glossing over the distinct ways in which actors connect to the normative market 
models and the suppression of differently situated opinions on the reform is visible in the way 
“Europe” and “Europeanization” are used discursively.25 The Romanian securities 
commission builds on the involvement of CESR and of the European Commission in the 
process and uses the motive of Europeanization as a self-understood reason to accept the 
reform. During the interviews I realized, directors in the securities commission have 
repeatedly claimed that the new regulations are “more modern and more harmonized” with 
the European framework, failing to specify what that mans exactly and in what respects that 
is an improvement from the previous situation in spite of my repeated questions on the 
issue.26 A similar rhetoric monopolizes the mass-media interviews and newspaper articles 
published by specialists affiliated with capital market authorities in Romania.27  
The discourse about Europeanization, insistently and superficially used by public 
authorities in Romania during the last years, is performative28 to the extent that it creates the 
appearance of unconditional agreement with reforms and de-legitimates alternative critical 
                                                                                                                                                  
imitation and assimilation of Western models as a way to modernize Romania and to avoid a long term 
“natural” evolution towards modernity. 
24
 The starting point for Titu Maiorescu’s formulation of the vaguely defined theory of “forms without 
substance” is his article În contra direcţiei de astăzi în cultura română (Against the Contemporary Direction in 
Romanian Culture) published in 1868. For a more nuanced presentation of the cultural debates on the 
modernization of Romania see Constantin Schifirnet, Formele fără fond, un brand românesc (The Forms 
without Substance, a Romanian Brand), Bucharest, Comunicare Publishing House, 2007. 
25
 This blatantly contradicts the purpose of public consultations meant to encourage critical assessments of the 
new regulations in order to eliminate their problematic provisions in a timely manner and to build their 
legitimacy gradually. 
26
 See the interview realized in September 2006 cited above. 
27
 Such interviews and opinion articles are published regularly by the financial newspapers in Romania such as 
Bursa, Ziarul Financiar, Săptămâna Financiară or on the Money Channel (a TV station dedicated to business 
programs). 
28
 The concept launched by John L. Austin in his How to Do Things with Words (1962) is adopted here to 
describe the effects of the manipulation if the idea of Europe and of the process of Europeanization by 
Romanian authorities. For a good illustration of the way the concept can be used to describe the effect of 
financial theories on communities of brokers and their practices see Donald MacKenzie, An Engine Not a 
Camera: How Financial Models shape Markets (2006). 
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position at the moment of their articulation. In this regard, the lay investors I interview are 
relegated to an inferior position characterized by ambiguity (although they know very well 
what their interests are). This hierarchy of discourses achieved in practice disfavors retail 
investors for a variety of reasons. Thus, lay investors and actors adopting a critical stance 
towards the reforms introduced by the state find it hard to question the contemporary political 
consensus on the necessary Europeanization of Romania. Even more, as the discourse about 
Europeanization is monopolized by public authorities, it is almost impossible for the lay 
investors to ground their claims in an equally legitimate grand narrative. Last but equally 
significant, lay investors appeal to “European” values such as the virtues of transparency and 
generalized public dialogue on reforms at the same moment they have to argue that the 
American model of the capital market was better as far as they were concerned.   
From a different perspective, the focus on the local process of cultural translation 
neglects the wider debates in Europe over the varieties of capitalism more compatible with 
the aims and values of the Union: on the one hand, the more individualistic, more efficient, 
yet “predatory” Anglo-Saxon model and, on the other hand, the better regulated forms of 
social capitalism dominant in many countries of Continental Europe.29 The over-simplifying 
dichotomy between the two main varieties of capitalism glosses over a situation that is more 
nuanced more complicated and harder to classify then one is lead to believe. The intense 
debates within “the West” itself over the desirable types of capitalist formation or over the 
aims and forms of regulations are made more visible by the recent sub-prime crisis and the 
reevaluation of the role of (risk) credit rating agencies. Ironically, as various researchers of 
the phenomenon have shown, with regards to financial regulation and the infrastructures of 
the financial market, the “Paris [pan-European] consensus” on the matter seems to enforce 
the neo-liberal dogmas more effectively than the “predatory” American regulatory framework 
based on self-regulation [Abdelal 2007].30  
Given the multifaceted disputes centered on the contemporary regulatory reform of 
Romanian capital market, a different approach, one paying attention the diversity of actors 
involved in the process and meant to shed light on the pragmatics of the observed 
                                               
29
 The Financial Times constitutes an excellent source of information on the positions with regards to the 
varieties of capitalism in America and Europe expressed by academics, financial analysts and politicians.   
30
 In spite of the current events in global financial markets, American regulations, at least those pertaining to the 
investment fund industry, are more comprehensive than the European ones. Not only do lay investors have more 
means of controlling the activity of asset managers in the American fund industry, but the issues of corporate 
governance are treated as an integral part of mutual fund regulations. This is unlike in the European framework 
(for which CESR is the initiator) where corporate governance is a separate area of policy for the European 
Commission. This conceptual and political distinction was underlined by Carlo Comporti, CESR Secretary 
General in an interview realized by the author in Paris on August 1, 2008. 
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interactions, can render the entire process understandable. In this sense, I regard the legal 
contentions stemming from this process as forms of action situated in context rather than 
simply as debates over cultural formations. Moreover, negotiations over the social values and 
moralities permeating the various regimes of monetary accumulation in Eastern Europe play 
out in disputes over regulations. In this regard, I neither treat values as the determinants of 
social action nor simply the result of it, but rather as constituents of action which themselves 
take a lot of effort to be negotiated and made to appear as taken for granted.31   
Consequently, this research focuses on the continuous renegotiation and routinization 
of values occasioned by arguments about new meanings of money, altered understandings of 
risk, or changing roles for the state and the regulatory agencies. Several issue seem to 
generate insoluble disputes among diverse participants in these debates and have 
consequently organized my research. First, the (mis)fit between new forms of investment and 
monetary accumulation dependent on the erratic behavior of the market and the previous 
notions of money whose value was intimately linked to personal diligence (or any legitimate 
form of work) is a resilient theme that emerges in most of the scandals generated by financial 
collapses in post-communist Romania.32 This theme becomes more acute with the emerging 
forms of social inequality based on the manipulation of money and financial practices. 
Second, a resilient understanding of risk as a communal category whose effects can be 
mitigated by the collective action of investors comes in direct contrast to newer conceptions 
of risk (promoted by the champions of the capital market) as a measure associated with a 
portfolio of previous personal choices, and as an assessment of the situation of individual 
investors rather than collective subjects. This theme emerges from disputes over the specific 
form a mutual fund should take as either a collective entity owned by the investors or as an 
abstract product (very similar to a bank deposit) that can be managed and marketed by an 
asset manager towards a diversity of individual investors. Last but not least, the ongoing 
arguments between supporters of a state that should be concerned with the taming of 
generalized forms of social risk through direct intervention and those of a state whose 
regulatory role should be limited to the adoption and enforcement of technocratic rules. 
Although the various forms of state intervention in the financial markets are hard to separate 
in practice, the above distinction between forms of political and regulatory intervention 
                                               
31
 I am indebted to the ethnomethodological literature on values, values-in-use and their social constitution 
(Jayussi 1984, 1991). 
32
 Various anthropologists of Eastern Europe have identified this motive in the case of many other financial 
scandals happening in most of the former communist countries in the region (Verdery 1995a, b, Humphrey 
2000, Mandel and Humphrey 2002, Korovilas 2004). 
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captures well the options available for state authorities during the post-communist financial 
crises.33  
To sum up the disputes over the regulation of mutual funds in contemporary Romania, 
the specific provisions of the new EU inspired regulations they take away more of the rights 
of the investors in mutual funds (especially the Council of Trustees), and thus serve as alibis 
for the measures adopted by the Romaniana securities commission with regards to the 
defaulted funds, that is, for the reorganization of the collapsed funds, for their continuation as 
close-end funds, and for the obscuring of the legal responsibility for the defaults. As a 
consequence, the investors I work with became very critical of the regulatory reform and are 
quite outspoken about it. The emerging disputes about regulations both mirror and play-back 
into the disputes over compensations for the collapsed funds.   
 What come out  repeatedly during my research is the preference of small investors for 
a more collective form of action in connection to the funds and to their investments (i.e., 
something close to the American model of the regulations) at the expense of the more 
impersonal and individual relations suggested by the EU inspired regulations. Such people 
know they have recuperated some of their money only when they acted collectively (through 
investors’ associations and various NGOs representing their interests) and believe that the 
worth of each investor and her monetary gain are premised exactly on the inclusion in such 
collectivities.34 At the same time, they are afraid that behind the impersonal regulations and 
rules of transparency poorly enforced by the securities commission brought about by the new 
regulations administrators will have enough freedom to defraud new funds as they will no 
longer be controlled by investors. Such claims of lay investors reflect, in my opinion, a 
generalized sense of insecurity towards the abstract forms of high finance and the uneasy 
reception of and lack of trust in undertakings otherwise common in market economies. 
My claim is, thus, that the uneasy reception of the new institutional arrangement is 
related to the shifting premises for the formation of value and the deeper changes in the 
prevalent conceptions of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991) associated with Romania’s 
                                               
33
 A similarly framed choice is currently faced by state authorities in the USA and Europe having to decide on 
the most appropriate forms of state intervention in the banking industry with the purpose of preventing a general 
collapse of the financial system. 
34
 This opinion was repeatedly recorded in interviews realized by the author with lay investors struggling to 
recuperate the money lost with the collapse of FNI and FNA.  It raises fundamental questions about the catalysts 
of social action in contemporary Romania. Thus, in spite of the simplistic explanations trying to link the 
unprecedented success and growth of the two mutual funds to the forms of institutional communication adopted 
by the asset managers and the banks involved, to the “impersonal” legal forms, or to the aggressive TV 
commercials at the time, ethnographic research indicates that action was rather situated in discrete social 
network. Such networks of acquaintances, friends and relatives, the medium through which practical examples, 
information, and knowledge are disseminated, is where the bases of collective action are set.  
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economic transition. Whereas formerly mutual funds were associative entities which, in spite 
of the ambiguous ownership, could be controlled by a collective of investors, the legal 
reforms attribute control over funds to management firms and do away with the premises for 
collective action by investors. The transition from a political order in which the premises for 
rights, action and value were defined collectively, as part of a larger community of investors, 
to a polity in which criteria of worth are premised on the more abstract qualification of 
investors - as actors able to choose among investment opportunities but no longer to influence 
the projects they take part in, generates numerous contentions with a direct impact on the 
legitimacy of the new institutional arrangements. 
 
Conclusions 
The assemblage of practices, institutions, actors, and issues in dispute can reveal the implicit 
or explicit conceptions about what money is, what are the moral ways to multiply it, what are 
the roles and responsibilities of the state in safeguarding the legal modalities for the 
accumulation of money, and what are the rights of investors associated in mutual funds. In 
such settings, money constitutes a rich set of metaphors organizing people’s ideas about value 
and worth. It forms a pivotal category that allows insight into the deep processes of social 
change undergone by post-communist societies over the past two decades. A focus on money 
allows the researcher of change to capture both the diverse institutional projects meant to 
direct reforms and the substantive engagement with such processes of differently situated 
social actors.  
This paper described the disputes occasioned by the harmonization of investment fund 
regulations in Romania with those of the EU trying to situate the process both within the 
broader post-communist change and in the middle of the legal contentions generated by 
several financial collapses in contemporary Romania. While the CESR and EC driven 
process of pan-European harmonization of capital market regulations was meant as a 
reflexive process open to the feed-back and criticism from market actors, its transposition in 
Romania is at best problematic. The problems raised by this institutional transposition 
illustrate well the way EU processes are adapted and refashioned in local arenas transforming 
European policies into multifaceted and decentralized phenomena. The diverse reception of 
European policies is caused not only by the differences among the national arenas in the EU, 
but equally by the variety of local actants within national arenas. Asymmetries of power, 
wealth and knowledge among the actors on local financial markets are responsible for the 
nuanced reception of EU initiatives in different contexts. Furthermore, the multitude of social 
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experiences generated by the post-communist change in Eastern Europe is the most important 
cultural factor accounting for the way apparently centralized processes are mediated locally. 
In specific contexts and building on histories of financial disputes, local actants appropriate 
pan-European initiatives filtering them through local meanings of money and value and 
adapting them to their immediate goals. In the process, the very premises of social action get 
renegotiated; ideas of ownership, risk, and value are refashioned generating new orders of 
worth that further constitute the medium into which new institutional imports are made.  
Although specific moral judgments and appeals to certain values are implicitly 
negotiated in the process of arguing over concrete issues, what seems to have been reinforced 
over the years and with each scandal in Romania is an attitude in which the appeal of new 
and risky financial ventures promising unprecedented monetary gains and the prudent option 
for collectivist institutional solutions known to have worked in the past are combined in 
creative ways. In spite of the contradictory appearance of such mixed attitudes, this captures 
well the simultaneous lack of trust in any formal and abstract solution and the immediate 
copying of practices and attitudes that both proved to work in previous situations and are 
adopted by large numbers of those sharing similar experiences. It also explains the peculiar 
forms of social order and change witnessed in contemporary Romania.  
The conflicting forms of knowledge and distinctive understandings of values 
illustrated by the disputes analyzed in this paper raise challenging questions about the limits 
of knowledge in financial processes (both before and after the events) and their implications 
on the economic and legal responsibilities of those making financial decisions for the many 
(lay investors). can somebody be convicted when realizing that the herding of investors can 
lead both to unprecedented growth (a process called “irrational exuberance” by Alan 
Greenspan and Robert Schiller (2000) and to the overnight collapse of even the biggest 
financial institutions? How can legal responsibilities be inscribed in regulations so that the 
resulting entities are attractive for both lay investors and asset managers? What are the 
possible and desirable forms of public regulation that would make financial risks 
knowledgeable, public and limited? 
Questions such as the above are urgent matters in former socialist countries where 
most of the former state run social protection systems are externalized to the market and built 
on the infrastructure of financial arrangements (e.g. the implementation of private pension 
systems or the privatization of state ownership). In Romania they are brought to the fore by 
the ongoing efforts to harmonize regulations as a premise for the better integration of capital 
markets in the European Union. Moreover, the global relevance of such issues was made 
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obvious by the current financial crises triggered by the collapse of the sub-prime sector in the 
United States and by the huge losses produced to Societe Generale (the second largest 
commercial bank in France) by a single rogue trader. What are the peculiarities of forms of 
knowledge characterizing late financial capitalism and is increasing sophistication decreasing 
or rather augmenting risks? What are the appropriate forms of regulation and should they be 
concerned with facilitating the creation of value or with investor safety? 
 The connections between knowledge, measurability and value, central for the 
practices involving money throughout the world, reveal some of the fundamental dimensions 
of social change in post-communist Romania. Leaving behind a world in which most of the 
financial processes tended to be subordinated by central planning and having as an ideal the 
complete redundancy of money (although in the informal sector of the second economy 
alcohol, cigarettes, or coffee plaid the role of money substitutes) my informants struggle to 
make ends meet in a world where money is the pervasive idiom in discussions about value. 
Departing from a world of monetary stability (there was no inflation, no bankruptcies, only 
one single state savings bank, and regular payments of salaries in socialism) my informants 
now experience a world where goods are standardized and abundant, yet money is 
increasingly fluid, object of manipulation, uncertain, new and diverse, having a lot of 
possibilities for spending and investment. It is not always easy nor safe to accept reflexive 
forms of knowledge and value, that is, the logic of late capitalism where the success of 
financial ventures is as much premised on rational investing as on the mutual belief of 
investors in the future growth prospects of that enterprise. This sense of insecurity is all the 
more acute in a social setting where the episodes of deception have been numerous and have 
usually ended with defeats and losses for lay investors. It is particularly difficult to accept 
that the value of money is not necessarily dependent on God, gold, or the patronizing state 
but rather reflexively linked to the generalized trust of al those interchanging it.  
This specific outlook makes it easier to understand the ethos of my informants and the 
specific form of change it makes possible. Change does not come as a result of stable 
preexisting configurations of value that make possible a new social order, but more as a result 
of accidental arrangements of events in specific situations. Previously tested routines are 
applied to new situations which often result in misappropriations generating mutations in 
social meanings and change as unintended consequences. Thus, change happens while many 
are still looking backwards and the past enters the present not as continuity but as an instance 
replicated instrumentally in situations of radical uncertainty. The ongoing challenge is to 
understand how people accommodate such forms of persistent instability and how they 
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routinze the continuous negotiation of values implicit in social action. The understanding of 
the practical negotiations of values is the key for the scholarly representation and 
ethnographic writing of processes of social change.   
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